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FORECLOSURE SURPLUS IN
MISSOURI: A RULE IN SEARCH OF A
THEORY
I. INTRODUCTION
The hornbook rule on disposition of a surplus from foreclosure of a mort-
gage or deed of trust is fairly straight-forward: "the surplus stands in the place
of the foreclosed real estate and the liens and interests that previously at-
tached to that real estate now attach to the surplus."' In itself, this rule ap-
pears rather uninteresting. However, an examination of the Missouri cases
yields several significant departures from the rule. Missouri precedents would
allow holdings that: a surplus will be paid according to the literal terms of the
mortgage;2 a mortgagee senior to the foreclosing mortgagee may be entitled to
a surplus over junior lienors in certain circumstances;3 and a judgment lien
does not attach to the proceeds of a foreclosure.4 Attempting to reconcile the
Missouri cases provides both an interesting explication of the nature of a mort-
gage5 in general and, in particular, of the concept of "equity of redemption."
It also leads to practical conclusions for the handling of a foreclosure surplus
in Missouri.
II. BACKGROUND - HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The theoretical underpinnings of foreclosure surplus treatment are de-
rived from the response to changing views of mortgages and from the relation-
1. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE § 7.31 (2d ed. 1985).
2. Trenton Motor Co. v. Watkins, 291 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956); see
infra notes 71-109 and accompanying text.
3. Willis Lucas Lumber Co. v. Neal, 222 Mo. App. 728, 4 S.W. 1098 (1928);
see infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
4. Warner v. Veitch, 2 Mo. App. 460 (1876); see infra notes 120-34 and accom-
panying text.
5. Throughout this Comment, the terms applicable to a mortgage - "mort-
gage", "mortgagee", and "mortgagor" - will be used to refer to both mortgages and
deeds of trust unless the distinction is of particular relevance to the discussion, such as
when a particular dispute involves the duty or conduct of the trustee under a deed of
trust. Even though a casual inspection of the cases indicates that deeds of trust are
much more prevalent than mortgages in Missouri, the convention of the commentators
appears to be the use of mortgage terminology. An explanation for the prevalence of
the deed of trust over a mortgage may be the old authority that the purchase by the
mortgagee at a power of sale foreclosure under a mortgage would not terminate the
mortgagor's equity of redemption. See Gaines v. Allen, -58 Mo. 537, 544 (1875).
It is also assumed herein that "foreclosure" refers to both a judicial foreclosure
under Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.190 (1986) and a power of sale foreclosure under Mo.
REV. STAT. § 443.410 (1986) unless specifically stated otherwise.
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ship between mortgagors and mortgagees.6 Therefore, analysis of the Missouri
cases must begin with a brief history of mortgages. 7
At an early stage of mortgage law in England, a mortgage served as a
conveyance from the mortgagor to the mottgagee of the land intended as se-
curity.8 In substance, this conveyance to the mortgagee was a fee subject to a
condition subsequent - if the mortgagor paid his debt within the time limit of
the condition, title to the property reverted to him.' As a result of the convey-
ance to the mortgagee, the lender was the "owner" of the land and was enti-
tled to all legal incidents of the estate.10
A mortgage, therefore, thus began as an absolute conveyance, subject to
condition subgequent, of title to a mortgagee. Yet the legal concept was clearly
an attempt by the courts, and parties themselves, merely to develop a means to
secure a debt with real property."1 As a result of the conveyance, the mortgage
at law frequently had harsh and unintended results (at least to the mortgagor)
because the mortgagor would lose his land on a default in payment regardless
of whether he had an excuse for his late payment.12 In addition, the mortgagor
was still liable for the entire debt regardless of the value of the property
forfeited.' 8
This type of harshness set the stage for the intervention of equity courts
and resulted, in time, in the development of two key concepts in mortgage law:
the mortgagor's right to redeem or the "equity of redemption"' 4 and the mort-
gagee's right to foreclosure. 5 The concept of "equity of redemption" evolved
as the right of the mortgagor to tender payment "within a reasonable time of
forfeiture" and thereby obtain title to his land even though the date set in the
deed for re-entry had passed."' Thereafter, foreclosure developed as the con-
comitant right of the mortgagee to have the "reasonable time" for redemption
set by the equity courts, after which time the mortgagor's right to redeem was
cutoff.' 7
6. See infra Section III of text.
7. The history of mortgages has been dealt with in much greater detail. See 1 L.
JONES, LAW OF MORTGAGES §§ 1-17 (8th ed. 1928); G. OSBORNE, LAW OF MORT-
GAGES §§ 1-15 (2d ed. 1970); 1 C. WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE § 23 (4th ed.
1927); see also Benton Land Co. v. Zeitner, 182 Mo. 251, 271-77, 81 S.W. 193, 199-
200 (1904) (en banc).
8. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 5, at 9.
9. Id.; 1 L. JONES, supra note 7, § 5.
10. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 5, at 9-10.
11. Id. § 7, at 15.
12. Id. § 6, at 12; 1 L. JONES, supra note 7, § 5.
13. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 6, at 14.
14. Id. 'at 13.
15. Id. § 10, at 20.
16. Id. § 6, at 12-13; 1 L. JONES, supra note 7, §§ 7-8.
17. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 10, at 20. Thus, the equity of redemption is a
right that exists only prior to foreclosure. It must be clearly distinguished from "statu-
tory redemption" - the right of the mortgagor or his assigns to redeem the property
within one year after foreclosure pursuant to the requirements of Mo. REv. STAT. §
[Vol. 53
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Two contributions to mortgage law that were made in the Unite4 States
are important to analyzing the application of foreclosure surplus. These contri-
butions were the development of the lien theory of mortgages and the demise
of strict foreclosure. The lien theory placed the legal, as well as equitable, title
for the mortgaged land in the mortgagor.1 8 However, once the legal as well as
the equitable title was placed with the mortgagor, strict foreclosure was "un-
fair" to the mortgagor.l° Solving this inequity through the use of foreclosure
by sale led, in turn, to the problem of what to do with the surplus that might
then be generated by a foreclosure sale.
Under English law the "equity of redemption" was considered to be the
mortgagor's equitable estate in the land, while legal title was vested in the
mortgagee.20 In the United States, however, the legal incidents of the mortga-
gee's title were gradually whittled away. As American courts began to find
virtually all of the legal incidents of ownership to be part of the mortgagor's
interest in the land, it became logical to find the mortgagee's interest in the
property was really only a "lien." 21 This was particularly appropriate in that it
had always been acknowledged that the conveyance to the mortgagee was in-
tended as security for a debt rather than a true conveyance. 22
In an attempt to arrive at a theoretically elegant description of the lien
theory, one commentator argued that a mortgage still served to convey a legal
interest in the mortgaged property to the mortgagee. But, the only incident of
title conveyed by the mortgage is the owner's power of sale. 3
The Miss9uri Supreme Court arguably has supported this position:
"In law, a mortgage is considered, as between the mortgagor and mortgagee,
443.410 (1986). The right of statutory redemption does not accrue until equitable re-
demption has been terminated by foreclosure and hence the rights are not co-extensive.
Euclid Terrace Corp. v. Golterman Enters., Inc., 327 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Mo. Ct. App.
1959); see G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 8; see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.410 (1986)
("[A]II real estate which may be sold under any such power of sale in a mortgage deed
of trust ... shall be subject to redemption by the [mortgagor].").
Furthering the confusion, a recent case found a statutory basis for the equitable
right of redemption in Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.400 (1986). See Tipton v. Holt, 610
S.W.2d 659, 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). The Missouri Supreme Court subsequently
referred to the pre-foreclosure right discussed in Tipton as "a statutory right of re-
demption." Belote v. McLaughlin, 673 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); cf. White
v. Smith, 174 Mo. 186, 199-200, 73 S.W. 610, 612 (1903); Pollock v. Pesapane, 732
S.W.2d 253, 254 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). However, the applicability of § 443.400 to
equitable redemption from power of sale foreclosure has been sharply contested. See
Note, Redemption Before Foreclosure Under Power of Sale, 47 Mo. L. REv. 354, 357-
60 (1982).
18. 4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1190 (5th ed. 1941).
19. Id.
20. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 7, at 16; cf. 1 L. JONES, supra note 7, §§ 12-14.
21. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 16; 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 18, § 1190.
22. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 16.
23. See Gavit, Under The Lien Theory of Mortgages Is The Mortgage Only a
Power of Sale?, 15 MINN. L. REv. 147, 152 (1931).
1988]
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and so far as it is necessary to give full effect to the mortgage as a security for
the performance of the condition, as a conveyance in fee . . . . But for all
other purposes it is considered . . . as a mere charge or incumbrance (sic),
which does not divest the estate of the mortgagor." '
Thus, "the mortgagor continues [as] the real owner of the fee."2
As the lien theory became prevalent, the mortgagee's remedy became lim-
ited to debt from the security only.26 Under strict foreclosure, the mortgagee's
original remedy to cut off the right of redemption, a mortgagor was given a
fixed period within which to pay off the debt. In essence, the foreclosure re-
formed the deed from the mortgagor to the mortgagee, eliminating the condi-
tional right to re-enter on payment of the debt. If the mortgagor did not pay
within the time set by the equity court, the title to the land was made absolute
in the mortgagee even if the value of the land exceeded the debt.27 Strict fore-
closure therefore was inequitable in many cases,28 but nonetheless was consid-
ered appropriate in that the mortgagee had legal title and the right to possess
the land.2 9 Because under the lien theory "a breach of the condition for pay-
ment merely [gave] to the mortgagee a right to proceed against the security,
the natural remedy for such breach was to sell the property and apply the
proceeds thereof to the payment of the mortgage debt."30
Missouri apparently has never accepted strict foreclosure.31 As a conse-
quence, this transition from strict foreclosure to foreclosure by sale cannot be
directly examined in Missouri case law. However, discussion of the transition
in other states illustrates courts' concern for the inequity inherent in strict
foreclosure.
Illinois, at least implicitly, connected the concepts of the mortgagor as
owner of the mortgaged land and the perceived inequity of strict foreclosure
when its courts limited strict foreclosure to only those cases in which no sur-
plus would be produced by a sale.32 Moreover, when strict foreclosure was
24. Benton Land Co. v. Zeitner, 182 Mo. 251, 273, 81 S.W. 193, 199 (1904) (en
banc) (quoting 2 J. PERRY, TRUSTS § 6020) (5th ed. 1899)); see also City of Spring-
field ex reL S. Mo. Trust Co., 305 Mo. 43, 51-52, 264 S.W. 771, 773 (1924).
25. Zeitner, 182 Mo. at 274, 81 S.W. at 200.
26. 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 18, § 1227.
27. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 10; 1 C. WILTSIE, supra note 7, § 24.
28. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 10.
29. 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 18, § 12272; 2 C. WmTsIE, supra note 7, § 901.
30. 2 C. WILTSiE, supra note 7, § 901.
31. See O'Fallon v. Clopton, 89 Mo. 284, 290, 1 S.W. 302, 303 (1886); Davis v.
Holmes, 55 Mo. 349, 351 (1874); Kreyling v. O'Reilly, 97 Mo. App. 384, 389, 71 S.W.
372, 373 (1902).
32. See Boyer v. Boyer, 89 Ill. 447 (1878). The Illinois courts only permitted
strict foreclosure in limited circumstances:
in [the] rare cases, when it appears the property is of less value than the debt
for which it was mortgaged and the mortgagor is insolvent, and the mortga-
gee is willing to take the property in discharge of his debt. But it is not proper
when there are other incumbrances upon the property, or creditors or pur-
chasers of the equity of redemption.
[Vol. 53
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used in Illinois, the mortgagee could not obtain a deficiency judgment. He was
limited to satisfaction of the mortgage from the land.33 Nor was strict foreclo-
sure permitted when the mortgagor had additional creditors - whether se-
cured or unsecured.34 These restrictions resulted in strict foreclosure being al-
lowed only when the foreclosing mortgagee was willing to suffer an economic
loss from use of the remedy, and no economic loss from the choice of remedy
was allowed to be suffered by any other person interested in the land.
Of greater interest is the interrelationship between a mortgage as a lien,
the shift to foreclosure by sale, and the mortgagor's interest in the surplus.
This relationship was explicitly recognized by the Minnesota Supreme Court
in Wilder v. Haughey.35 In Wilder, the mortgagor was in default due to his
own neglect; nevertheless, the court refused to order strict foreclosure because
the mortgagee was unable to show any harm would result from foreclosure by
sale.36 In so deciding the court argued for the preference for foreclosure by
sale as opposed to strict foreclosure in foreclosing a "mere" lien:
"Where the estate is pledged . . .merely[] for the payment of the debt, a
strict foreclosure would often be unjust and inequitable, disappoint the inten-
tions of the parties, defeat the object of the security ... and sometimes pro-
duce most serious injury to the mortgagor .... A public sale is the truest test
of the value of the estate as a resource for the payment of the demand; and to
such a sale upon sufficient notice ... neither party can justly object: it is the
best mode of disposing of the property for the interest of both. If the estate is
worth more than the debt, the mortgagor will have the benefit of the surplus;
and if it produces, by a fair sale of it, less than the amount due.., the debtor
ought to make up the deficiency.""
Developing case law found that strict foreclosure was inequitable in sev-
eral respects. Strict foreclosure allowed the mortgagee to retain an excess ben-
efit; that is, the amount by which the fair market value of the land exceeded
the mortgage debt. Further, strict foreclosure did not recognize the economic
Id. at 449 (quoting Farrell v. Parlier, 50 Ill. 274, 275-76 (1869)).
33. Id.; see Miller v. Davis, 5 Ill. App. 474, 475-76 (1879) (decree awarding a
judgment for deficiency in addition to a decree of strict foreclosure improper even
though the facts of the case "might support a decree of strict foreclosure" alone).
34. In Boyer, the mortgagor had died and left an insolvent estate. The court held
that strict foreclosure was inappropriate even though the mortgage debt exceeded the
value of the land. Apparently, the existence of other creditors of the estate was suffi-
cient to invoke the rule of limiting strict foreclosure even though there was no indica-
tion that such creditors would be entitled to any proceeds - the mortgage debt ex-
ceeded the value of the land and presumably all of the proceeds would have gone to the
mortgagee. Boyer, 89 Ill, at 449-50. Therefore, the court appears to have relegated
strict foreclosure to the most limited of circumstances. See also Rourke v. Coulton, 4
I11. App. 257, 261-62 (1879) (improper to order a strict foreclosure of a first deed of
trust where there was a second deed of trust on the land).
35. 21 Minn. 101 (1874).
36. Id. at 104.
37. Id. at 103-04 (emphasis added) (quoting Lansing v. Goelet, 9 Cow. 346, 356
(N.Y. 1827)).
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expectations of the parties because it did not recognize a mortgage as what it
had always been intended to be - a pledge of land as security for a debt.3"
Thus, strict forclosure gradually was supplanted by foreclosure by sale.
This increasing prevalence of foreclosure by sale gives rise to the issue of
who is entitled to the surplus from a foreclosure sale. Foreclosure sales gener-
ate a cash fund from which the mortgagee's claim is satisfied. Because one
purpose of foreclosure by sale is to realize the full value of the land, the cash
fund very possibly can exceed the foreclosing mortgagee's claim. Similarly, the
foreclosing mortgagee is no longer allowed to retain what had been the excess
benefit obtained from strict foreclosure. Under foreclosure by sale, this excess
benefit is considered the surplus of the sale. The question thus becomes the
priority of junior interests in this surplus.
III. THE THEORY OF SURPLUS APPLICATION
The general rule of surplus application was set out in the Introduction
(above). In equity the surplus is applied to junior interests in order of priority
because "the surplus stands in the place of the foreclosed real estate ....,39
However, a more complete explanation of the theory underlying this rule is
necessary to analyze the shortcomings of Missouri case law.
This theory is found by comparing the economic concerns which caused
the shift from strict foreclosure to foreclosure by sale40 with the various par-
ties' interests in the surplus.' In a historical context, courts have treated fore-
closure surplus as the remainder of the mortgagor's equitable estate, i.e., his
equity of redemption, with priority in the surplus based on the notion that a
junior lienor is an assignee of that equity of redemption."2 Thus, it is possible
38. See supra text accompanying note 22.
39. See supra text accompanying note 1.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38.
41. This analysis is broadly outlined in Pomeroy's discussion of the equitable
maxim: "Equity regards and treats that as done which in good conscience ought to be
done." See 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 18, §§ 364-65, 376. The discussion of the parties'
expectations with regard to foreclosure surplus is particularly suggested by this
material.
The focus in this section on the economic expectations of the parties is not in-
tended to suggest that it is the only relevant factor, merely that it will tend to
predominate in a discussion of the expectations surrounding a security interest. An
alternative view is suggested in the textual discussion of Trenton Motor Co. See infra
notes 100-109 and accompanying text.
42. Jones v. Shepard, 145 Mo. App. 470, 479, 122 S.W. 764, 767 (1909). As
stated in Jones:
Junior incumbrancers will take precedence over the mortgagor as regards the
right to have their demand paid out of the surplus, because the execution of a
junior mortgage amounts to an assignment of the mortgagor's equity of re-
demption to the junior mortgagee and of the assignor's right in equity to the
surplus in case of a sale of the prior incumbrance.
Id.; see also In re Reid, 73 Bankr. 88, 90 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
[Vol. 53
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to explain the nature of foreclosure surplus by an analogy to the concept of the
equity of redemption.
The first consideration is the meaning of the term "equity of redemption."
The term is arguably obsolete. It referred to the mortgagor's equitable estate
in his mortgaged land.4 3 But under the lien theory, the mortgagor owns the
entire estate, not just the equity of redemption." Nevertheless, the concept of
the mortgagor's "equity of redemption" remains important in analyzing the
disposition of foreclosure surplus. It is used to refer to both the mortgagor's
right to redeem after default4 5 as well as the estate of the mortgagor. 46 In
Missouri, the "equity of redemption" is clearly considered real property capa-
ble of conveyance 47 or inheritance,48 and subject to execution.4 9 Further, to
give effect to the intentions of the various parties, the surplus after foreclosure
is considered as retaining the "real" character of the land.50
If the equity of redemption is the right of the mortgagor, prior to foreclo-
sure, to pay off the arrearages and receive the land,51 how is the value of that
right measured? The value of the right will be the mortgagor's net receipts
upon exercising the right - the fair market value of the land less the cost of
exercising that right. That "cost" will be the balance of the remaining debt.52
This can be depicted numerically:
43. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
44. See supra text accompanying note 23; 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 18, § 1190;
1 L. JONES, supra note 7, § 14; Bowmar, Mortgage Foreclosure in New York: Omitted
Lienors, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 509, 526 (1987).
45. See supra text accompanying note 17.
46. Benton Land Co. v. Zeitner, 182 Mo. 251, 274-75, 81 S.W. 193, 200 (1904).
47. See Reid v. Mullins, 43 Mo. 306, 308 (1869).
48. Benton Land Co., 182 Mo. at 274, 81 S.W. at 200; see 1 L. JONES, supra
note 7, § 16.
49. See Munday v. Austin, 358 Mo. 959, 969, 218 S.W.2d 624, 630 (1949);
Holloway v. Holloway, 103 Mo. 274, 283, 15 S.W. 536, 538 (1891); Hubble v.
Vaughn, 42 Mo. 138, 142 (1868).
50. Kreyling v. O'Reilly, 97 Mo. App. 385, 389, 71 S.W. 372, 373 (1902).
51. See supra text accompanying note 16. Only with an acceleration clause does
the amount necessary to redeem become the full amount of the debt. See Mills v. First
Nat'l Bank, 661 S.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
52. This ignores the incidental costs of foreclosure that the mortgagor may or
may not be required to pay in order to redeem prior to foreclosure. See Tipton v. Holt,
610 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (where the deed of trust specified an attor-
ney's fee only on foreclosure or suit on the note, such fee could not be required for valid
tender prior to sale).
1988]
7
Pursell: Pursell: Foreclosure Surplus in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

















This is not a new description. It merely illustrates the concept of the mea-
sure "owner's equity" in land. However, this depiction is interesting in that it
shows that owner's equity is the same amount as the surplus remaining after
foreclosure sale. The surplus is simply the sale price less the debt and less the
cost and expenses of the sale. As long as the sale price is equal to the fair
market value of the land, 3 the two values - equity of redemption and fore-
closure surplus - will be the same. Therefore, the foreclosure surplus is
equivalent to the cash value of the owner's equity of redemption. This princi-
ple clearly serves as the foundation for considering foreclosure surplus as the
remainder of the equity of redemption."4 And it is this equivalence between
53. This assumption is, perhaps, wishful thinking. See Weschler, Through the
Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict Foreclosure - An Empirical
Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 850
(1985).
54. "Where the foreclosure sale produces a surplus, the rules governing who par-
ticipates in the surplus and the priority of that participation are generally clear. The
major underlying principle is that the surplus represents the remnant of the equity of
[Vol. 53
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the parties' interest in the land - a real property interest - and their expec-
tations as to the surplus which serves as a basis for concluding that an equita-
ble conversion has occurred, that is, the foreclosure surplus is properly consid-
ered real property even though it is cash. 5



















Figure 2-Two Secured Debts, First Mortgage Foreclosed
This illustrates, when compared to Figure 1, the concept of a second
mortgage as an "assignment of the equity of redemption." 6 It gives rise to the
redemption and security wiped out by the foreclosure." G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN,
supra note 1, § 7.31.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 61-64.
56. See supra note 42; cf. infra note 116.
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concept of a second mortgagee's right and interest in the surplus as the
equivalent of the second mortgagee foreclosing on the surplus. 57
Once again, the importance lies in focusing on maintaining the parties in
the same relative position with respect to the surplus as they occupied with
respect to the original real property, rather than concentrating upon the spe-
cific descriptive phrases themselves. Thus, the mortgagor's "equity" after giv-
ing a second mortgage is measured by the fair market value of the land less
the cost of exercising the right of redemption (that cost being the payment of
the balance remaining on both the first and second mortgage debts). A mort-
gagor taking out a second mortgage contemplates securing the debt essentially
by the value of the land equivalent to the new debt. He has, in essence, as-
signed a portion of the value of his right to exercise his "equity of redemp-
tion." In Figure 2, this assignment is valued at $30.58 If the second mortgagee
foreclosed his claim and the sale was for the fair market value, he would antic-
ipate receiving the value of this assigned portion; in the example, the full $30.
Any surplus over this claim is the remainder of the mortgagor's interest in the
land and thus goes to the mortgagor. Similarly, if the first mortgage was fore-
closed instead of the second, the second mortgagee would still anticipate re-
ceiving the value of his secured claim, however, this time from the surplus,
$50 in the figure, rather than by a direct foreclosure sale. The fact that the
first mortgage is foreclosed, rather than the second, does not change the rela-
tionship between the second mortgagee and the mortgagor. As long as the
parties intended that the land serve as security for the second mortgage debt
at the time the second mortgage was executed, then both the second mortga-
gee and the mortgagor are held to this intent when their respective interests in
the land are converted to money by foreclosure of the senior mortgage."
Thus, a junior lienor's interest in the surplus derives from his expectation
that the land will serve as a means of satisfying the obligation he is owed. The
surplus cash remaining after foreclosure of a senior lien includes the junior
lienor's interest in the land. Similarly, the mortgagor's interest in the surplus
derives from his expectation that the value of the unencumbered portion of the
land "belongs" to him.60 The equivalence of these two interests in the real
property and the surplus leads to placement of the surplus in the proper hands.
There is, however, a conceptual problem in such placement which arises from
the nature of foreclosure itself.
• 57. Cheek v. Savannah Valley Prod. Credit Assoc., 244 Ga. 768, 770, 262 S.E.2d
90, 92-93 (1979); cf. Kreyling v. O'Reilly, 97 Mo. App. 384, 388-90, 71 S.W. 372, 373(1902) (where the statute of limitations barred the second mortgagee from enforcing
the debt secured by his mortgage, the second mortgagee could not enforce a claim to
the surplus remaining after foreclosure of the first deed of trust).
58. See supra note 42.
59. See J. POMEROY, supra note 18, § 365.
60. Compare the economic expectations of the debtor/creditor relationship seen
as a justification for abandoning strict foreclosure, supra text accompanying notes 37-
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While there is an identity of a party's interest in the land with his interest
in the surplus, an essential purpose of foreclosure is to extinguish all interests
junior to the lien being foreclosed.61 Even so, the parties interest in the real
estate is transferred to the surplus by a two step process. First, the surplus is
treated as if it were still realty to which the junior interests attached. It is the
subject of an equitable conversion:
[T]he surplus money realized by the sale of land under a mortgage or deed of
trust is treated as realty and not as personalty in respect to the rules of law
governing its disposition. It remains real estate in the hands of the mortgagee
or trustee to be disposed of according to the law of real property.62
With such an equitable conversion, the interests of the parties in the land
remain in the surplus. This is true both because the surplus is considered, in
equity, as realty and because equity will continue to recognize the liens in the
surplus as if it were realty; notwithstanding the fact that such junior liens are
extinguished by foreclosure.63 This rule is not peculiar to foreclosure; a compa-
61. See, e.g., City Bank & Trust Co. v. Thomas, 735 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) (junior lease); Brask v. Bank of St. Louis, 553 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1976) (condominium common expense lien); Sipes v. Kansas City Title Ins. Co.,
372 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963) (deed of trust); Estes v. Richard, 166 Mo.
App. 585, 588-89, 149 S.W. 1165, 1166 (1912) (judgment lien). The result is particu-
larly clear for a judicial foreclosure. According to Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.280 (1986):
A purchaser under a sale by virtue of an execution on a judgment rendered in
pursuance of the provision of sections 443.010 to 443.440 [judicial foreclo-
sure] shall take a title as against the parties to the suit, but he shall not be
permitted to set it up against the subsisting equities of those who are not
parties thereto.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.280 (1986).
62. Kreyling v. O'Reilly, 97 Mo. App. 384, 389, 71 S.W. 372, 373 (1902); cf.
Huffard v. Gottberg, 54 Mo. 271 (1873). In Huffard, a deed of trust secured the pay-
ment of ten promissory notes. Where only the first note was in default and foreclosed
and sale of only part of the land occurred, the court held the surplus was subject to the
lien of the junior notes. The surplus was to be applied to "the notes in the order as they
became due." Id. at 273.
63. See 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 18, 1167 n.15. Similarly, a New Jersey court
has described the application of foreclosure proceeds as an equitable partition:
The theory upon which such surplus proceeds are held to be land is that the
surplus usually arises because more land is sold than is necessary, in one case
to pay the debts of decedent; in another (foreclosure), than is necessary to
satisfy the mortgage debt; and in partition, because the land is impossible of
division and for practical purposes it has been converted into money. But in
each case the money stands for the land, and the rights therein are deter-
mined as though the court were dealing with the land itself. Upon an applica-
tion for distribution of such surplus moneys, the division amongst those enti-
tled is, in effect, an equitable partition of the land for which the money
stands. The excess, though in the form of money, remains, as before, im-
pressed with the character of the land.
Morris v. Glaser, 106 N.J. Eq. 585, 592-93, 151 A. 766, 771 (1930).
The process of placing a surplus in the hands of junior interest has also been de-
nominated as a trust. See Foster v. Potter, 37 Mo. 525 (1866). Foster involved a chat-
tel mortgage in the form of a deed of trust with a number of shares of stock as the
1988]
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rable rule of equitable conversion can be found in condemnation cases.
Thus, courts have employed equitable conversion and equitable liens to
fulfill expectations that arise from ownership and assignment of the "equity of
redemption. '6 5 This, in turn, yields the simple rule that the surplus should be
paid out in the order of priority of junior interests. 6 But, the temptation to
deviate from this apparently simple rule calls for consideration of its underly-
ing principles. Strict foreclosure was abandoned in favor of foreclosure by sale
both to treat the mortgagor fairly and to ensure that the economic expecta-
tions of the parties were fulfilled.17 The economic expectations of the parties
are that the surplus will replace the interest in the land. In the case of a junior
lienor, the expectation is that the surplus will replace his security interest in
the land, or equivalently, the amount he would have realized if he had fore-
closed first. 8 For the mortgagor, his expectation is that the surplus will re-
place the value of the unencumbered portion of his land.6 9
IV. PROBLEM CASES
A. Trenton Motor Co. v. Watkins"0
Trenton purports to follow a rule for distributing surplus proceeds to the
party designated in the deed of trust7 1 as opposed to the general rule outlined
above. In Trenton, a first deed of trust was executed by the trustor which
provided that on foreclosure, after payment of the note and expenses of the
security. A foreclosure of the chattel mortgage resulted in a surplus and a dispute over
this surplus arose between a purchaser of the equity of redemption under a junior exe-
cution sale and a judgment creditor whose lien arose subsequent to the foreclosure of
the chattel mortgage. Id. at 527-28. The court found that "[w]hen the property was
sold under the deed of trust for the payment of the notes secured, the surplus remain-
ing over became subject in [the trustee's] hands to a trust for the benefit of the [pur-
chaser under the junior execution sale]." Id. at 534.
Pomeroy argues that such events are correctly denominated an equitable lien and
are merely "analogous to trusts." 4 J.'POMEROY, supra note 18, § 1234 (emphasis in
original).
64. See Ross v. Kendall, 183 Mo. 338, 347-48, 81 S.W. 1107, 1108 (1904) (the
condemnation award "represented and stood in place of the land condemned, and the
claimants had the same right to and interest in the money that they had had in the
land.... The change in form of the res did not change the rights of the owner and
lienor, respectively.").
65. See discussion of Foster v. Potter, supra note 63; see also supra note 42.
66. See supra text accompanying note 1.
67. See supra text accompanying note 37.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 56-61.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
70. 291 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
71. 291 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956); see also Hilfiker v. Preyer, 690
S.W.2d 451, 452 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (dictum). But cf. In re Reid, 73 Bankr. 88, 90
(E.D. Mo. 1987) (note holder under a junior deed of trust was entitled to the surplus
from the foreclosure of the first deed of trust notwithstanding language in the first deed
of trust "that the remainder, if any, [was] to be paid to the grantor.").
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sale, the surplus "shall be paid to the [trustor] or her legal representative.""2
The trustor subsequently died intestate and her son took possession of the
property as her sole heir. The son, defendant, then executed a note secured by
a second deed of trust on the same piece of property to the plaintiffs, Trenton
Motor Co.. After default on the first deed of trust, the trustee foreclosed, the
note and expenses were paid, and the trustee was left with a surplus. Trenton
asserted a right to the surplus as a junior lienor7 3 and the intestate's legal
administrator intervened claiming a right to the surplus under the terms of the
first deed of trust.
7 4
On appeal the court held that the proceeds must be paid to the adminis-
trator under the terms of the first deed. Although the administrator had not
followed the proper statutory procedure for claiming the proceeds as part of a
probate proceeding, the first deed gave the proceeds to the "trustor or her
legal representative." Thus, the administrator, as "legal representative" of the
intestate, was entitled to the surplus.7 5 To state the holding another way, the
court specifically held the administrator was not entitled to the surplus under
probate law; he could not acquire the surplus by his statutory authority. In-
stead, the basis for his receiving was his supposed mortgage law right stated in
the terms of the deed.7 6
Under the probate statutes, the ownership of real property is conveyed by
operation of law to a decedent's heirs upon the decedent's death.77 This con-
veyance to an heir is subject only to the right of the administrator acting
under order of a probate court to take possession of the real estate to satisfy
debts of the decedent.78 Thus, there is a distinct practical consequence in de-
termining whether the surplus from foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the
decedent is personal property or real property. While an heir can immediately
possess the real estate, the debts of the decedent's estate act as a contingent
"lien" against the decedent's real estate that is superior to any liens created by
the heir. The debts are a lien in the sense that the proceeds from the sale of
the real estate are only used to pay the debts of the decedent. Any surplus
remaining after payment of the decedent's debts is applied to satisfy any jun-
ior liens created by the heir or is returned to the heir himself rather than
72. Trenton, 291 S.W.2d at 660.
73. Id. at 661.
74. Id. at 661, 664.
75. Id. at 664.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 663. See also Mo. REV. STAT. § 473.260 (1986):
When a person dies, his real and personal property, except exempt property,
passes to the persons to whom it is devised by his last will, or, in the absence
of such disposition, to the persons who succeed to his estate as his heirs; but it
is subject to the possession of the executor or administrator... and is charge-
able with the expenses of administering the estate ....
Id.
78. Trenton, 291 S.W.2d at 663; Mo. REV. STAT. § 473.263(2) (1986); see infra
text accompanying notes 79-83.
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becoming part of the residual estate29 This "decedent's debts" lien is a supe-
rior contingent lien in the sense that the decedent's debts take precedence over
any liens created by the heir 80 only if the proper probate order is obtained. 81
By contrast, personal property is subject to immediate possession by the legal
administrator of the estate without an order of the probate court.82
Therefore, if the surplus is personalty, then the administrator is entitled
to the surplus proceeds in his statutory capacity as the administrator of the
estate notwithstanding any liens created by the heir. However, if such surplus
is realty, then the administrator has only a "contingent lien" against the sur-
plus and is not entitled to the surplus unless he has an order of the probate
court to take possession the decedent's real estate. Not surprisingly then,
courts consistently have held that foreclosure surplus retains its real property
character in probate and passes to the heirs, not the administrator, absent an
order of the probate court for the administrator to take possession of the real
estate of decedent.83
79. State ex rel. Enyart v. Doud, 216 Mo. App. 480, 487, 269 S.W. 923, 924
(1925) (where a devisee had mortgaged her interest in the devised real estate after a
court order authorizing a sale of the land to pay the decedent's debts and the land was
subsequently sold, any surplus remaining in the executor's hands "goes to the person in
whom the title to real estate was vested when it was converted.").
80. Lemmon v. Lincoln, 68 Mo. App. 76, 79 (1896) (where decedent's heir mort-
gaged real estate he inherited before the estate had been probated and subsequently the
administrator obtained a court order to sell the land to pay decedent's debts, the heir's
mortgagee was held to be junior to the decedent's creditors.).
81. Mo. REV. STAT. § 473.263 (1986) states:
1. Every executor or administrator has a right to and shall take possession of
all the personal property of the decedent ....
2. The court... may order the executor or administrator to take possession of
the real estate of the decedent when necessary for the payment of claims or
for the preservation thereof.
Id. (emphasis added); cf Crigler v. Frame, 632 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (the
administrator of an estate had no standing to maintain a suit for partition of decedent's
real estate absent a prior order of the probate court instructing the administrator to
take possession of the real estate for the purpose of paying the debts of the decedent).
The Crigler court held that the phrase "[tihe court . . . may order" in
§ 473.263(2) meant an order of "the probate division of the circuit court." Crigler, 632
S.W.2d at 96 (quoting § 472.010(6)). Earlier versions of § 472.010 were not as clear-
cut in restricting this to an order of the probate court, but the cases have assumed that
they were so limited. See Trenton Motor Co. v. Watkins, 291 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1956); see also In re Beauchamp's Estate, 184 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1945); Field v. French's Estate, 106 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937).
The purposes for which the executor or administrator may take possession of real
estate are set out in §§ 473.460 and 473.490. See McIntosh v. Connecticut Gen. Life
Ins. Co., 366 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1963).
82. Mo. REV. STAT. § 473.263(1) (1986) (text of statute supra note 81). The
difference in statutory treatment between personal and real property is apparently quite
intentional and departs from the treatment in the corresponding section of the Uniform
Probate Code. See Clapper v. Chandler, 406 S.W.2d 114, 119-20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966)
(distinguishing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 124).
83. Trenton Motor Co. v. Watkins, 291 S.W.2d 659, 663-64 (Mo. Ct. App.
[Vol. 53
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In Trenton the administrator did not obtain such an order, and the court
specifically held the administrator was not entitled to the surplus in his statu-
tory capacity. Instead, the court held the administrator was entitled to the
surplus as the named recipient in the foreclosed deed of trust."4 Yet there is no
authority in Missouri to make such a distribution.8
1956); Arrowood v. Delaney's Estate, 295 S.W. 522, 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927); State
ex reL. Enyart v. Doud, 216 Mo. App. 480, 487, 269 S.W. 923, 924 (1925); Kreyling v.
O'Reilly, 97 Mo. App. 384, 389, 71 S.W. 372, 373 (1902). In all these cases, the
foreclosure occurred after the death of the mortgagor (the same result would apply if it
was the death of mortgagor's grantee). Although there is some authority for a different
result if the foreclosure occurred prior to the mortgagor's death, there is no indication
it has been followed in Missouri. See 2 C. WILTSIE, supra note 7, § 981.
The only statutory limitation on foreclosure in the probate context serves merely
as a postponement rather than a bar. Under § 443.410, the foreclosure is stayed for six
months after the mortgagor's death, but no other action is required of the mortgagee
other than the normal statutory requirements to commence foreclosure after this date.
"If any person shall die owning real estate on which there is an outstanding deed of
trust or mortgage of real estate... no sale shall take place under the deed of trust or
mortgage conveying real estate within six months after the death of such person . .. ."
Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.410 (1986). See also Lass v. Sternberg, 50 Mo. 124 (1872).
84. Trenton Motor Co. v. Watkins, 291 S.W.2d 659, 663-64 (Mo. Ct. App.
1956).
85. In Hilfiker v. Preyer, 690 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), the court cited
Trenton Motor Co. as standing for the proposition that "ordinarily disposition of the
proceeds of a foreclosure sale are ascertained from the directions of the deed of trust."
See Hilfiker v. Preyer, 690 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). However, this
"rule" was not necessary to the court's decision of the case. The surplus clause did not
cover the issue the court was confronted with - a dispute over a surplus by co-makers
of a note who had secured the note by separate deeds of trust covering their separately
owned property. Id.
If nothing else, Trenton Motor Co. is an interesting lesson in creative case citation.
To support the proposition that surplus proceeds should be paid out according to the
terms of the foreclosed deed of trust, the Trenton court cited Jones v. Shepard, 145
Mo. App. 470, 122 S.W.2d 754 (1909), and Lolardo v. Lacy, 337 Mo. 1097, 88
S.W.2d 353 (1935), and In re Lacy, 234 Mo. App. 71, 112 S.W.2d 594 (1937). See
Trenton, 291 S.W.2d at 662-63. However, the results of these cases are considerably
different than the Trenton court suggested.
Jones v. Shepard was quoted by the Trenton court for the proposition that
"[o]rdinarily how a trustee who sells property under a deed of trust shall dispose of the
proceeds, must be ascertained from the directions of the instrument, provided these are
not in conflict with the law." Trenton, 291 S.W.2d at 662 (quoting Jones, 145 Mo.
App. at 479, 122 S.W. at 767). This is a correct statement as far as it goes. However,
the next sentence of the Jones court makes it quite clear this rule is only applicable
when there are no encumbrances junior to the deed of trust being foreclosed; that in
fact, a junior lienor is entitled to the surplus over the mortgagor. Jones, 145 Mo. App.
at 479, 122 S.W. at 767, Jones is inapposite on the facts as well - it was trying to
resolve the truly unusual problem of who was entitled to surplus proceeds from foreclo-
sure of a second deed of trust that occurred after the first deed of trust had already
been foreclosed. Id.
Equally creative was the Trenton court's use of Lolardo v. Lacy, 337 Mo. 1097, 88
S.W.2d 353 (1935) and In re Lacy, 234 Mo. App. 71, 112 S.W.2d 594 (1937). Both
cases dealt with the trustee of the foreclosed first deed of trust (Lacy) attempting to
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In the case, decedent's son had fee simple title to the land because of the
intestate succession statutes coupled with the administrator's failure to obtain
an order to take possession of the real estate.8 This placed the son in the
identical position as he would have been as a grantee of his mother. Moreover,
since the early case of Reid v. Mullins,8 7 it has been clear that a grantee is
entitled to any surplus from a foreclosure over his grantor.88 Notwithstanding
any language in the foreclosed deed specifying that the surplus be paid to the
original grantor or his legal representative, "[the grantor has] conveyed his
equity of redemption to the [grantee, who] ... became substituted thereby to
the place and right of the original grantor, and, as such, [is] entitled to receive
the surplus in his stead." 89
A similar departure from the literal terms of a surplus provision can be
found in Kimmer v. Walsh.90 A husband and wife executed a deed of trust to
secure an individual debt of the husband with the wife's separate real estate. 1
When the deed of trust was foreclosed after the wife's death, the surplus was
held payable to the wife's heirs, not to the husband for the benefit of his credi-
tors.92 The court reached this result notwithstanding a surplus clause that
specified the surplus "be paid to the grantors of the deed or their legal repre-
sentatives." 93 In equity the surplus belonged "to the party of whose property it
was the proceeds . . .," i.e., the wife's heirs. 94
The Trenton holding, standing alone, indicates the surplus should be paid
to the recipient named in the deed. Yet these other cases make it clear that
the surplus clause cannot be read literally in many situations. If the grantor/
mortgagor no longer owns (or never owned, as in Kimmer v. Walsh) an inter-
est in the land, he or she is not entitled to the surplus even if the foreclosed
keep the surplus for his own benefit. Lolardo, 337 Mo. at 1102, 88 S.W.2d at 355-56;
In re Lacy, 234 Mo. App. at 83-84, 112 S.W.2d at 601. While Lacy was disbarred for
retaining the surplus for his own benefit, the amount in dispute was the remainder after
Lacy had paid off the junior deed of trust. Lolardo, 337 Mo. at 1108, 88 S.W.2d at
359; In re Lacy, 234 Mo. App. at 81-83, 112 S.W.2d at 600-601. As such, the Trenton
court's implication that an attorney/trustee will be disbarred if he fails to follow the
literal trust deed terms on the disbursement of any foreclosure surplus are hardly worth
crediting. This is not to suggest that a trustee does not have a duty to properly apply
the proceeds; In re Lacy holds the trustee to just such a duty. However, the Lacy cases
do not stand for the rule that the surplus must be applied only according to the literal
terms of the deed of trust.
86. See Trenton Motor Co. v. Watkins, 291 S.W.2d 659, 663-64 (Mo. Ct. App.
1956); Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.260 (1986).
87. 43 Mo. 306 (1869).
88. Id. at 308; Johnson v. Wilson, 74 Mo. 639, 640-41 (1883).
89. Reid, 43 Mo. at 308.
90. 44 Mo. 65 (1869).
91. Id. at 67-68.
92. Id. at 68-69.
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deed specifies that such surplus be paid to him or her. 5 The reasoning under-
lying this is straight forward: if the original mortgagor has conveyed the land
to a subsequent grantee, then the original mortgagor no longer has an interest
in the land. It should make no difference whether the conveyance was made by
deed or operation of law. In either event, there is no reason for the surplus,
which is in essence the remainder of the land,96 to go to a party who no longer
owns an interest in the land. As a consequence, the general concept of a sur-
plus clause providing notice to subsequent parties of how a surplus will be
distributed cannot be derived from the Trenton case.
But arguably the Trenton rule of paying the surplus to the party named
in the surplus clause will still be valid in a situation where the original trustor
named as recipient of the surplus remains the owner of the foreclosed prop-
erty. The argument is that where the owners of the property at the time of the
foreclosure are also the "trustors" specified in the deed to receive the surplus,
then any junior lienors have notice of this provision in the first deed and there-
fore cannot complain if the surplus is paid in accordance with the deed terms.
However, this completely ignores the commercial setting in which mortgages
arise.
The purpose of a mortgage, in the first instance, is to provide security for
the mortgagor's debt. 7 Where the lender is a junior mortgagee, he will be as
interested in protecting his security interest as if he were the senior mortgagee.
However, the foreclosure of the senior mortgage wipes out the junior mortga-
gee's security interest.9 8 Under the generally accepted rule, the junior mortga-
gee's interest will attach to the surplus and have priority over the mortgagor.99
But, under the Trenton rule, the junior mortgagee faces the prospect of having
his mortgage converted into an unsecured loan anytime a senior lien forecloses
first. The junior mortgagee already runs the risk of "losing" his security if a
senior lien forecloses first and the property has declined in value after the date
the second mortgage was given, though this is a common commercial risk. If
the junior mortgagee also faces having no security for his loan anytime a sen-
ior lien is foreclosed first, he has only two economically rational choices. First,
he can never accept a second mortgage when a senior mortgage as a Trenton-
type clause except where the mortgagor is sufficiently creditworthy to ensure
that the loan will be repaid without any need for security. Second, the junior
lender can file a request for notice of sale of senior liens100 and then petition
95. Reid v. Mullins, 43 Mo. 306, 306, 308 (1869).
96. See supra Section III of text.
97. See supra text accompanying note 22.
98. See supra note 61.
99. See supra note 42.
100. In the case of a power of sale foreclosure, the statutes require that notice be
given by publication, Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.320 (1986) but the only personal notice
required is by mail and then it need only be given to persons requesting a notice of
sale, as well as the original mortgagor and the owner of the property at the time of the
sale pursuant to Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.325(3) (1986). This request for notice must be
filed with the recorder of deeds of the county where the mortgaged land is located. Mo.
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for a judicial foreclosure upon receiving such notice.101 The former would be a
commercially undesirable result, while the latter would not only be undesirable
from the perspective of judicial economy but also defeat the purpose of power
of sale foreclosure.
One solution is to change the language used in the first deed of trust.
While this does little for the parties attempting to structure a second mortgage
after a first deed of trust with the offending clause has been recorded, it is
available as a change for all future deed of trust forms. Yet such uncertainty
should never have been necessary. Reasonable interpretation under existing
law is available that would prevent the contortions of the law created by the
Trenton court.
The Trenton court's problems, from a mortgage law standpoint, began
when it insisted on treating surplus as real property. Its apparent chain of
logic was:
1. Surplus is real property;'02
2. Real property passes to the mortgagor's heirs unless the legal adminis-
trator obtains an order of the probate court to take possession of the land for
the payment of the debts of decedent;"0 3
3. The legal administrator had not obtained such an order; therefore, the
legal administrator could not have the surplus under the probate statutes.' 04
This syllogistic progression evidences the court's determination to grant
the surplus to the legal administrator rather than its application of rational
legal principles. Such determination led to the concoction of literal interpreta-
tion theory of "equitable conversion." While the court should not necessarily
be condemned for this attempt to give the surplus to the legal administrator, it
should be for the method used.
In Trenton, the grantor/heir was named the original legal administrator,
then skipped town without attending to the estate. 05 Arguably, therefore, the
son was aware of the status of the estate. Trenton Motor Co., the junior mort-
gagee, at the very least had constructive notice of the problem. Because the
Rav. STAT. § 443.325(1) (1986). Thus, if a junior lienor does not file a request for
notice of sale or does not scan the newspaper every day, he is apt to lose the benefit of
his lien. This is not a problem, however, in the case of a judicial foreclosure. See supra
note 61.
101. The junior mortgagee would have standing to maintain a foreclosure suit.
City of Springfield ex reL S. Mo. Trust Co., 305 Mo. 43, 52, 264 S.W. 771, 773
(1924). Similarly, the beneficiary of a deed of trust (the lender/secured party) is the
proper plaintiff in a judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust. Sanders v. Kastner, 222
S.W. 133, 134-35 (Mo. 1920). Arguably, therefore, the junior mortgagee would be
entitled to a simultaneous foreclosure in a judicial proceeding and thereby get the bene-
fit of his lien. See statutes discussed infra note 174.
102. Trenton Motor Co. v. Watkins, 291 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 663-64.
105. Id. at 661.
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land had not passed through probate, title would have been in the decedent's
name, not in the son's. Additionally, there was evidence that Trenton had ac-
tual notice of the prior deed of trust. 06 Finally, if the legal administrator in
this case had gone to the probate court first, he would have been entitled to an
order to take charge of the surplus as realty.0 7 Under these facts the court
could not have awarded the surplus to the legal administrator on general equi-
table principles. There would be no failure of parties' expectations because
Trenton was aware of the prior claim. If the first step in the court's reasoning
had been that no equitable conversion occurred, then the surplus would have
been simply treated as cash. Therefore, with the surplus considered personalty,
the legal administrator would have been entitled to the proceeds without an
order of the probate court.1 0 8
The Trenton analysis invites courts to meddle with what had been, prior
to Trenton, a bright line rule. Such uncertainty is not desirable in a commer-
cial setting absent a showing of actual deceit.1 19 In addition, it invites a con-
flict with what appears to be well settled principles of Missouri probate law.
As a consequence, the best conclusion is that the holding in Trenton be strictly
limited to the facts of that case.
B. "Notice" Cases
The problems in Trenton must be distinguished from cases holding that,
where a second deed of trust which contains a surplus clause specifying that
any surplus will be applied to the first deed of trust is foreclosed, the clause is
controlling notwithstanding the general priority rule. This type of clause is
illustrated in Missouri by Willis Lucas Lumber Co. v. Neal.110 In Willis, there
were three outstanding deeds of trust secured by the same piece of property.
The second deed of trust was foreclosed, resulting in a surplus.11 The lan-
guage of the foreclosed deed of trust specifying application of any surplus to
106. Id.
107. Id. at 663; see also Lemmon v. Lincoln, 68 Mo. App. 76, 79 (1896) (where
decedent's heir mortgaged real estate he inherited before the estate had been probated
and subsequently the administrator obtained a court order to sell the land to pay dece-
dent's debts, the heir's mortgagee was held to be junior to the decedent's creditors).
108. See supra note 81.
109. See, e.g., Campbell v. Miller, 226 S.W. 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920). In
Campbell, a property subject to three deeds of trust had the second deed foreclosed.
The holder of the second note intentionally concealed this foreclosure (though appar-
ently the notice given was legally sufficient) and purchased the property at the sale for
his own benefit at a small fraction of its value. Id. at 597. As a result of this conduct,
the court held that the holder of the third note was entitled to the surplus resulting
from the subsequent foreclosure of the first deed of trust even though the third deed
had been terminated as a junior lien by the earlier foreclosure of the second deed. Id.
at 598.
110. 222 Mo. App. 728, 4 S.W. 1098 (1928).
111. Id. at 729, 4 S.W.2d at 1099.
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the first deed of trust was held to govern the distribution of the proceeds.' 12
The court stated that "the surplus arising from a sale under a second deed of
trust, in equity, goes to the payment of the third deed of trust . . . in the
absence of qualifying circumstances."' 1 ' But the court went on to hold that a
term in the second deed of trust specifying that a surplus should be paid on
the first note before being applied to the junior interests was such a "qualify-
ing circumstance.1 114
Willis is, however, the only type of factual context outside of Trenton
where this "notice" rule has been applied, and further Willis deals with an
unambiguous clause."15 In a context where the surplus clause is ambiguous,
there is little excuse for following its literal terms. As seen above, in a Trenton
fact situation, the surplus clause directing payment to "the mortgagor or her
legal representative" cannot be read literally. As such, it cannot serve as no-
tice to junior lienors. Additionally, a surplus distribution clause with the lan-
guage "to trustors, their heirs, successors or assigns" may be reasonably inter-
preted to include junior lienors within the meaning of "assigns." There are no
Missouri cases directly ruling that the term "assigns" in a surplus clause in-
cludes a junior mortgagee, but other states have so held. 16 However, Missouri
112. Id.
113. Id. at 730, 4 S.W.2d at 1099. The general rule for application of the surplus
from foreclosure of a junior deed of trust can be found in Helweg v. Heitcamp, 20 Mo.
569 (1854), where a tract of land subject to three deeds of trust had the second deed
foreclosed. The case considered the rights of the first and third note holders to the
surplus and, in finding for the third note holder, the court explained the general rule:
This court is of the opinion that the surplus money in the hands of the trustee
must be paid over to the plaintiff on the debt secured by the third deed. The
sale of the property, under and by virtue of the second deed of trust, did not
exonerate the property from the lien heretofore on it by virtue of the first or
oldest deed of trust; it was sold liable to that debt, and the parties interested
can still pursue it for that debt ....
The surplus therefore, must be applied, after payment of the debt and
cost of sale by trustee under the second deed of trust, towards the payment of
the debt mentioned and secured by the last deed of trust, the creditor in the
first being left to his remedy.
Helweg, 20 Mo. at 570.
114. Willis, 222 Mo. App. at 730-31, 4 S.W.2d at 1099-100.
115. A result similar to Willis can be found in Field v. Brown, 207 Mo. App. 55,
229 S.W. 445 (1921) where the court held that surplus from foreclosure of a second
deed of trust could be applied to a first deed of trust regardless of deed language when:
all parties that could be affected by this change were present at the sale; all affected
parties had agreed to the change; and, the new terms were announced at the sale so
that bidders were aware of the interest they would be purchasing. Id. at 59, 61-62, 229
S.W. at 447-48.
116. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note I, § 7.31, at note 6; see also
Nichols v. Tingstad, 10 N.D. 172, 86 N.W. 694 (1901). The Nichols court stated:
[The statute] provides for the payment of any surplus remaining in the hands
of the officer or person making the sale, after satisfying the mortgage, to the
"mortgagor, his legal representatives or assigns." . . . The mortgagor, having
executed a second mortgage upon the premises ... is deemed in law to have
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cases have characterized a junior mortgage as "an assignment of the mortga-
gor's equity of redemption to the junior mortgagee . .".". , A court in Mis-
souri faced with this issue could find either that a surplus clause specifying
distribution to "assigns" is ambiguous, thereby requiring application of the
general rule of distribution by priority; or could hold that a junior lienor is
included in the term "assigns." Thus, applying the Willis rule, there are no
"qualifying circumstances" in the clause to preclude applying the surplus to
junior liens.
Regardless of the particular clause used, the result should comport with
the reasonable expectations of the parties. Where a second mortgage specifies
that any surplus from its foreclosure will be paid on the first mortgage, any
potential mortgagee junior to the second mortgage has notice that his third
mortgage is unsecured to the extent that he can no longer rely on proceeds
from foreclosure of the second mortgage to satisfy his lien. Presumably, the
third mortgagee will charge the mortgagor for this additional risk. But no such
notice will occur when a more ambiguous clause, such as in Trenton, is used.
In this latter, ambiguous case the general rule should be followed.
C. Judgment Liens
The treatment of foreclosure surplus becomes more complicated when one
of the junior claimants asserts a judgment lien. Results vary depending on
whether the lien is from a general judgment or a mechanic's lien 18 and on
whether the mortgagor is alive or dead. 1 "
The rule in Missouri that a judgment lien does not have priority in the
surplus from a foreclosure sale originated in Warner v. Veitch." 0 In Warner, a
first deed of trust was foreclosed on property which was subject to a judgment
lien and then a subsequent mortgage. 2 1 The foreclosure resulted in a surplus
which the trustee paid to the junior mortgagee."' Warner, the assignee of the
original judgment lienor, sued the trustee for the amount of her judgment." 3
The court of appeals held that "[n]either in law nor in equity does the statu-
tory lien of a judgment follow the surplus produced by a sale of land under a
preexisting deed of trust.""14 As a consequence Warner was denied
assigned such surplus to the second mortgagee, if there had been any. The
word "assigns" is of sufficiently broad meaning, as defined by the authorities,
to include a second mortgagee under such circumstances.
Nichols, 10 N.D. at 178-79, 86 N.W. at 696.
117. See supra note 42; see also text accompanying notes 57-61.
118. See infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
120. 2 Mo. App. 459 (1876).
121. Id. at 460.
122. Id. at 461.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 462.
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recovery. 2 '
The precise basis for the court's determination that a judgment lien does
not "follow the surplus" is somewhat obscure. It relied on several arguments in
reaching this conclusion. First, the court asserted that a judgment lien ex-
tended only to real estate, and therefore could not attach to surplus proceeds.
Such proceeds belonged to the grantor of the original mortgagor. 2 ' Thus, the
court held "the money in this case was rightly paid to Saxton .... ,,127 The
problem with this conclusion was that Saxton was the second mortgagee, and
not the mortgagor. 28 Moreover, this second mortgage was junior to the judg-
ment lien. The only way Saxton would have been entitled to the funds was if
the surplus were considered realty after it passed by the judgment lien. But
the proceeds, under the court's reasoning, were personalty prior to reaching
the judgment lien in order that the judgment lien not attach to the surplus.
This is an odd construction of the equitable conversion principle at best.
It seems unusual to say that surplus is real estate if a secured creditor wants
to be paid but is not real estate if a judgment creditor wants to be paid. Nor
have the courts been adverse to finding that equitable conversion will allow a
judgment lienor to share in the proceeds of land in a context outside of
foreclosure. 2
The Warner court went on to assert the lack of authority for a judgment
lien attaching to the surplus. This is true in a narrow sense. The one case
cited, Strawbridge v. Clark,2 0 finds that a mechanic's lienor is entitled to the
surplus rather than a judgment lienor.' 3' Whether this is a reasonable distinc-
tion is considered below.' 32
Finally, the Warner court quoted at length from Conrad v. Atlantic In-
surance Co.'33 for the proposition that title to land is not conveyed by a judg-
ment lien. T'3 A closer reading of Conrad indicates, however, the point the
court made was that a senior judgment lienor is not entitled to the proceeds of
a sale under a junior judgment lien because the senior lienor is not the owner
of the property. This holding does not address the foreclosure surplus problem.
The rule prohibiting a judgment lienor from participating in a foreclosure
surplus was more persuasively stated in the recent case of Hawkins v. Al-
corn. 35 There, a deed of trust was foreclosed while the property was subject to
125. Id.
126. Id. at 462 (citing Reid v. Mullins, 43 Mo. 306 (1869)). For a discussion of
Reid v. Mullins, see supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 461.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 147-50.
130. 52 Mo. 21 (1873).
131. Id. at 22.
132. See infra notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
133. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828).
134. Warner v. Veitch, 2 Mo. App. 459, 462-63 (1876).
135. 698 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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several junior judgment liens."36 On appeal from the trustee's interplead of the
proceeds, the court followed Warner v. Veitch and awarded the proceeds to the
personal representative of the mortgagor's estate. However, the court went be-
yond simply following Warner v. Veitch and specifically addressed the judg-
ment lien statute. It held that proper interpretation of the statute required a
finding that judgment liens do not follow the surplus:
[U]nder § 511.350 RSMo Supp. 1984, a judgment against a person results in
a lien only against that person's real estate. Under §511.010 RSMo 1978, real
estate includes only "all estate and interests in lands tenements and heredita-
ments liable to be sold upon execution." This definition does not include pro-
ceeds from the sale of real estate.1 37
This interpretation, by excluding surplus merely because it is not specifi-
cally named in the statute, comports neither with the broad definition of "real
estate" as used in the statutes nor with the treatment of surplus as if it were
real estate as outlined in the above discussion of equitable conversion." 8'
Once again the essential question is whether surplus is or is not to be
considered "real estate", here for the purposes of the judgment lien statutes.
The rendition of a judgment itself creates a "lien on the real estate which
belongs to the persons against whom . . ." the judgment was rendered.139 The
existence of this "automatic" lien then depends on the definition of "real
estate."
136. Id. at 38.
137. 137. Id. at 39 (emphasis in original). The statute provides in full: "The
term 'real estate,' as used in this chapter, shall be construed to include all estate and
interest in lands, tenements and hereditaments liable to be sold upon execution." Mo.
REV. STAT. § 511.010 (1986).
138. See supra Section III of text.
139. Section 511.350 provides in full:
1. Judgments and decrees rendered by the supreme court, by any United
States district or circuit court held within this state, by any district of the
court of appeals, by any circuit court and any probate division of the circuit
court, except judgments and decrees rendered by associate, small claims and
municipal divisions of the circuit courts, shall be liens on the real estate of the
person against whom they are rendered, situate in the county for which or in
which the court is held.
2. Judgments and decrees rendered by the associate divisions of the circuit
courts shall not be liens on the real estate of the person against whom they
are rendered until such judgments or decrees are filed with the clerk of the
circuit court pursuant to sections 517.770 and 517.780, RSMo.
3. Judgments and decrees rendered by the small claims and municipal divi-
sions of the circuit court shall not constitute liens against the real estate of the
person against whom they are rendered.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 511.350 (1986). Prior to 1988, Rule 74 of the Missouri Rules of
Court purported to provide substantive definitions for judgments, e.g., Rule 74.34 defin-
ing a "judgment lien" and Rule 74.70 defining "real estate." These definitions were
eliminated in the new Rule 74, effective January 1, 1988. See 727-28 S.W.2d (Mo.
Cases) XXVIII-XXXIV (1987); Laughrey, Judgments - The New Rule, 44 J. Mo.
BAR 11, 11 (1988).
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Interests in land that are "liable to be sold on execution" are defined in
sections 513.010.1140 and 513.090. Section 513.090 provides in part:
The following property shall be liable to be seized and sold upon attachment
and execution issued from any court of record
(5)All real estate whereof the defendant, or any person for his use, was
seized, in law or equity, at the time of the issue and levy of the attachment, or
rendition of the judgment, order or decree whereon execution was issued, or
at any time thereafter. 14'
Further the "equity of redemption" itself is subject to sale under execution.14 2
Therefore, the rejection by the Hawkins and Warner courts of lien attachment
to surplus proceeds turns on a very literal reading of the term "real estate" as
used in Chapters 511 and 513.
This literal interpretation of the judgment lien statutes has not been fol-
lowed in cases where proceeds of realty are created by means other than power
of sale foreclosure. In both judicial foreclosure and partition by sale, there is
authority for allowing the judgment lienor to participate in the proceeds. In
the case of judicial foreclosure, the authority for applying the surplus to a
judgment lien is found in McGuire v. Wilkinson."43 In McGuire, property that
was the subject of four mortgages and a judgment lien was sold to satisfy the
mortgages. 144 The surplus remaining after satisfaction of the four mortgages
was "assigned" by the mortgagor to the fourth mortgagee. The court held that
the judgment lien in the property was not extinguished by the sale. Rather, the
surplus was subject to the lien and "was subject to garnishment in the hands
of [the fourth mortgagee] .' ' 14 This result is considerably different from
Warner where the court held the judgment lienor would have to garnish the
trustee prior to foreclosure to have a claim on the surplus." 6
Similarly, courts have applied this equitable lien remedy outside the con-
text of foreclosure. In Pococke v. Pococke,147 a creditor with a judgment lien
on the undivided interest of his debtor in a parcel of land was entitled to satis-
faction of his lien from the proceeds when the land was partitioned by sale
because "[t]he lien attached to the interest of [the debtor] in the proceeds of
140. "The term 'real estate,' as used in this chapter shall be construed to include
all estate and interest in lands, tenements and hereditaments." Mo. REv. STAT. §
513.010(1) (1986).
141. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 513.090 (1986).
142. Munday v. Austin, 358 Mo. 959, 218 S.W.2d 624 (1949) (en banc); Hollo-
way v. Holloway, 103 Mo. 274, 15 S.W. 536 (1891).
143. 72 Mo. 199 (1880).
144. Id. at 201. The facts of the case indicate that a single sale was held to
satisfy all four mortgages which would tend to indicate a judicial foreclosure, though
the opinion itself makes no statement one way or the other.
145. Id.
146. Warner v. Veitch, 2 Mo. App. 459, 463 (1876).
147. 2 Mo. App. 118 (1876).
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the sale .... "" The court justified this result with the rationale that, not-
withstanding the statute which terminated the lien upon confirmation of the
sheriff's deed from the partition sale, the lien should be impressed, in equity,
on the proceeds.14 9 "The object of an execution is to convert the land into
money, out of which the sum for which execution is issued may be satisfied.
This conversion had already been made by sale, under the order looking to
partition, before execution could issue under the judgment."15 0
There is a more basic problem with the Hawkins court's assertion that a
judgment lienor's claim fails because the lien is terminated at law. Foreclosure
"wipes out" all junior interests in the encumbered real estate, including junior
liens of all types as well as the interest of the mortgagor.151 Because the fore-
closure has wiped out his lien, a junior lienor can no longer enforce it, if for no
other reason than that there is nothing left to sell. But, he is allowed to take
the surplus precisely because it is a monetary measure of the lien he had on
the real estate.'52 It is the measure of what the junior lienor would receive if
he had been joined in a judicial sale, or similarly, what he would have received
(hypothesizing a perfect price) if a senior foreclosure did not clear the title of
all junior liens. So the issue is not really whether his lien is gone after a senior
foreclosure, this is surely the case. Rather the issue is whether a power of sale
foreclosure should allow junior lienors, in equity, the same benefits of their
liens as they would receive in a judicial action. This is particularly troubling in
that even a junior mortgage will participate only in the surplus if the mortgage
is considered, in equity, as real estate.
15 3
An analogy to judgment liens can be found in the mechanics' and materi-
almen's lien statute, Chapter 429 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri. The
statute uses similar, though not identical, wording to specify the type of prop-
erty to which it will attach:
The entire land [upon which work has been done] shall be subject to all liens
created by [Chapter 429] to the extent, and only to the extent, of all the
right, title and interest owned therein by the owner or proprietor of such
building, erection or improvement, and for whose immediate use or benefit the
labor was done .... 154
There is a readily apparent difference in the wording of the interest to
which the lien will attach: a mechanic's lien will attach to any "right, title or
interest' in a building, while a judgment is a lien on "all estate and interests in
land."'155 Additionally, a mechanic's lien is "perfected" without any court ac-
tion - it arises after the statutory prerequisites of notice - not as the result
148. Id. at 122.
149. Id. at 121-22.
150. Id. at 122; see also supra note 63.
151. See supra note 61.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 56-61.
153. See supra Section III of text.
154. Mo. REv. STAT. § 429.030 (1986).
155. See supra note 137.
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of a judgment rendered by a court. 56 However, the mechanic's lien must be
enforced through a court proceeding. 57 Further, a mechanic's lien results in a
lien on specific property of the debtor rather than all real estate of the debtor
within a county. 158
Beyond these distinctions, a mechanic's lien shares in the surplus from
foreclosure. The issue was indirectly decided in Strawbridge v. Clark,0 9 where
the surplus was the result of an execution sale on a senior judgment lien with,
in descending priority, a deed of trust and a mechanic's lien as junior liens. °10
The high bidder at the execution sale refused to tender after the first sale, and
therefore, the property owner was entitled to the difference between the high-
est bids of the first and second sales. However, the court held that this "sur-
plus" would have to be applied to the junior liens before the owner was enti-
tled to receive anything. "In this case the amount of the subsequent deed of
trust ... and the mechanic's lien was sufficient to exhaust the difference be-
tween the two bids . . . ."' Hence, the landowner had no claim against the
original high bidder.6 2
This decision was, at best, an indirect statement of the ability of a
mechanic's lien to share in the surplus of foreclosure. However, it did provide
authority when the issue was addressed directly in Boeschenstein v. Burde.'6 3
The Boeschenstein court simply dismissed Warner v. Veitch as inapposite
without discussion164 and held the mechanic's lienor was entitled to have his
lien paid out of the surplus. 165 Despite these arguments, there seems little
doubt that the Hawkins court reached the proper result. Within the probate
context, statutory interpretation suggests a situation where judgment liens
should be treated differently from other types of liens with respect to foreclo-
sure surplus. Where the mortgagor has died prior to foreclosure and a surplus
results there is a strong argument that a judgment lien may only be satisfied in
a probate proceeding.
There is specific statutory authority for subordinating a judgment lien to
claims against an estate in section 473.397.166 The court in Hawkins v. Al-
156. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 429.010 (1986).
157. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 429.170, 429.210 (1986).
158. See supra text accompanying note 153.
159. 52 Mo. 21 (1873).
160. Id. at 21.
161. Id. at 22.
162. Id.
163. 284 S.W. 202 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926).
164. Id. at 204.
165. Id. at 203; cf. East Atlanta Bank v. Limbert, 191 Ga. 486, 489-91, 12
S.E.2d 865, 867-68 (1941) (when a power of sale foreclosure results in a surplus, "the
surplus funds represent the equity of the owner in the real estate"; a mechanic's lien
would attach to the proceeds notwithstanding that the lien was extinguished at law).
166. Section 473.397 states:
All claims and statutory allowances against the estate of a decedent shall be
divided into the following classes:
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corn 1 7 relied on this provision to find that a judgment ought to be satisfied
within the probate proceeding even if the lien itself was not extinguished. 6
This provision, along with section 473.440, apparently was intended to insure
that the claims against the estate can be satisfied, particularly in a situation
such as in Hawkins, where the decedent's estate is insolvent. 169 However, these
two statutes would seem to subordinate a judgment lien only in cases where
the decedent's estate was insolvent. 7 0 Nevertheless, a section of the execution
statutes apparently requires all judgment liens to be satisfied through probate.
Section 513.075 provides in full:
No execution shall issue upon any judgment or decree rendered against the
testator or intestate in his lifetime, or against his executors or administrators
after his death, which judgment or decree constitutes a demand against the
estate of any testator or intestate, within the meaning of the statute respect-
ing executors and administrators; but all such demands shall be classed and




Clearly, then, the Missouri statutes contemplate that an execution will
not take place on a judgment lien when the judgment debtor's estate is in
probate. A judgment lien should never be satisfied from foreclosure surplus
(1) Costs;
(2) Expenses of administration;
(3) Exempt property, family and homestead allowances;
(4) Funeral expenses;
(5) Debts and taxes due the United States;
(6) Expenses of the last sickness...;
(7) Debts and taxes due the state of Missouri ... or any political subdi-
vision ... ;
(8) Judgments rendered against the decedent in his lifetime and judg-
ments rendered upon attachments levied upon property of decedent during his
lifetime;
(9) All other claims not barred by section 473.360.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 473.397 (1986).
167. 698 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
168. Id. at 39.
169. Id. Section 473.440 provides in part:
When any real or personal property of an estate is bound by the lien of
any judgment, attachment or execution, which attached prior to the death of
decedent, the personal representative, when the best interests of the estate
require, may obtain the redemption thereof, except that, if the estate is insol-
vent, the property subject to the lien shall be sold in the manner provided by
law for the sale of property for the payment of obligations of the estate. The
proceeds of the sale shall be used first to satisfy and pay the judgment or
execution without regard to the classification thereof, except that claims in
classes one through seven of section 473.397 have precedence over such liens,
and the residue, if any shall be administered as other assets ....
Mo. REV. STAT. § 473.440 (1986).
170. See Grace v. Lee, 227 Mo. App. 766, 769-70, 57 S.W.2d 1095, 1097
(1933).
171. Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.075 (1986).
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when the mortgagor or his grantee has died. Rather, the judgment should be
satisfied through the probate proceeding.
Notwithstanding these arguments, there is no clear authority for a trustee
paying a judgment lienor any portion of surplus proceed from a power of sale
foreclosure. If faced with a power of sale foreclosure, the judgment lienor
should attempt to garnish the trustee.27 2 It is doubtful he could force a judicial
foreclosure, though it is readily apparent that a junior mortgagee could do
SO. 173
V. CONCLUSION
There is ample justification in Missouri law, as well as the general theory
of mortgages, to justify the general rule that foreclosure "surplus stands in the
place of the foreclosed real estate and the liens and interests that previously
attached to that real estate now attach to the surplus"'' 4 in contexts except for
a judgment lien when the mortgagor's estate is in probate175 or where a sur-
plus clause unequivocally specifies a different recipient.1 6 Nevertheless, there
is sufficient confusion in the Missouri case law to warrant care in the applica-
tion of a foreclosure surplus in even seemingly ordinary circumstances. This is
particularly true for trustees of the deed of trust who owe a duty to all inter-
ested parties.177 When in doubt - interplead. 78
DAVID B. PURSELL
172. See Warner v. Veitch, 2 Mo. App. 459, 463 (1876).
173. Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.410 (1986) provides in part: "Deeds of trust in the
nature of mortgages of lands may, in addition to being forecloseable by suit, be also
foreclosed by trustee's sale . . . ." When read in connection with Mo. REV. STAT. §
443.190 (1986) which provides: "All mortgagees of real estate ...may file a peti-
tion ...that the equity of redemption may be foreclosed, and the mortgaged property
... sold to satisfy the amount due" (emphasis added), there appears no way for a
judgment lienor to force a power of sale foreclosure into a judicial foreclosure. See
Rust v. Kenmare Inv. Co., 235 Mo. App. 505, 136 S.W.2d 355 (1940) (the word
"mortgagees" must be read literally; the trustee of a deed of trust did not have stand-
ing to petition for judicial foreclosure). For a discussion of the junior mortgagee's right
to bring a judicial foreclosure, see supra note 101.
174. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 7.31.
175. See supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
177. Tipton v. Holt, 610 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
178. Id. at 663-64.
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